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WALTER S. HAYES
 Major General, U. S. Army
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Army Pearl Harbor Board Exhibit No. 63

"Planning for a Joint Operation 'Over the Top' by General C. G. ... published by ... New York, New York ... This book is not being reprinted in this proceedings."

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 63

[1]

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE

BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL L. T. GEROW,

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR PLANS DIVISION

BEFORE

MILITARY COMMISSION.

DECEMBER 18, 1941

DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT WAR PLAN

1. Joint Action of the Army and the Navy state the governing policies for joint action of the Army and Navy. These policies serve as basic guides in the preparation of war plans.

2. A war plan is prepared to meet a specific situation requiring the use of all or part of the Army and Navy of the United States. The plan in current use is known as Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5. Broadly considered, it consists of the following documents:

a. Report of the United States—British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1).

b. Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22).

c. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans—Rainbow No. 5.

d. Navy War Plan and subordinate plans based thereon.

3. The Joint Board in April, 1941, developed the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 based on a. and b. above. The work incident to the preparation thereof was done by The Joint Planning Committee. The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy in May, 1941.

4. Based on this joint plan the Army War Plans Division prepared Army Strategic Plan, which consists of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and Concentration Plan—Rainbow No. 5. A copy of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on August 21, 1941. Receipt was acknowledged on September 3, 1941. A revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by The Joint Board on November 19, 1941, and a copy of The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Revision No. 1, was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941. Receipt therefor has not as yet been received.

5. The missions assigned the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under the Army Strategic Plan are as follows:

a. Joint—Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in the coastal zone.

b. Army—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and the destruction of Axis sea communication by offensive action against the enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

c. Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

6. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established. Army Strategic Plan—Rainbow No. 5 placed the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in Category D. This category assumes the possibility, but not the probability of a major attack.

[3]

WAR PLANS, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

1. War Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consist of the following documents:

a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

b. Joint Defense plan, Hawaiian Theater, Naval Operations Annex.

c. Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations Orders, and plans subordinate thereto.

d. Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. These plans are based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange prepared for a situation involving a war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan. The Joint Mission, the Navy Mission, and the Category of Defense under the Orange Plan is the same as that under the Army Strategic Plan—Rainbow No. 5. The Army Mission under the latter plan has been somewhat broadened. Under all plans in existence the War Department's concept of the most probable form of attack which an enemy would adopt against Oahu was a surprise attack consisting of raids and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces and action by local sympathizers.

3. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Commandant 14th Naval District) and the Army Operating Defense Plans were forwarded to the War Department for review at time of issue, and published revisions thereto have been furnished from time to time. Such plans are not formally approved by the War Department and are not commented upon unless it appears that they are not in consonance with the Basic Army Plan as to concept, mission, and means assigned. Plans in force in the Hawaiian Department on December 7 were in process of revision based on the Army Strategic Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and recent changes and additions made in the means provided the Hawaiian Department.

4. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, which was revised March 28, 1941, prescribes the joint security measures to be taken for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. The following extracts from this plan are quoted in order to indicate the joint agreement in force on December 7, 1941:

"I. GENERAL.

"1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renunciation in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

"II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

"2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

"a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

"b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. [5] This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

"c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

"d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission."

5. A defense project of an overseas department includes:

First, a statement of the mission to be carried out by the Department Commander as defined by the War Department; second, a brief estimate of the situation outlining the most probable threats against the successful execution of this mission and indicating the course of action and the means necessary to carry out the mission; and, third, a concise statement of the requirements in troops, in defensive installations, construction other than housing, and the supplies and equipment considered necessary to carry out the mission. This summary includes priorities for accomplishment of the requirements enumerated and consolidated estimates of cost. The defense project is revised annually and is submitted to the War Department for approval.

6. The Hawaiian Defense Project, 1940, was approved by the War Department on September 17, 1941. The project contains revisions up to September 29, 1941. The following extracts from this document indicate the mission, the category of defense, and the possible and probable war situations as understood by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

"Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

"(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.

"(b) Sabotage.

[6] "(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.

"(d) Air raids carrier based.

"(e) Surface ship raids.

"(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet."

* * * * *

"Basis for Planning.

"Missions and Conditions.

"(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:

"The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D.

"The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange.

"(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

"(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

"(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

"(3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Departments point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will [7]

make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the 'cut-off from the Mainland situation'.

"(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

"(c) *Conclusion.*

"To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort."

ALERTS

1. Following is the chronological record of alerts held by the Army, sometimes in conjunction with the Navy, since July 17, 1940. (Some entries included to indicate awareness of situation.)

June 17, 1940

Radiogram War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department. "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

June 17, 1940

Radiogram from C. G., Hawaiian Department to War Department answering the above:

"All anti-aircraft observation and security detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in defense of any essential installations. No excitement. Navy in-shore and off-shore patrols in operation."

June 24, 1940

[8] Letter General Herron to Chief of Staff: (Reference to alert ordered above)

"I have just come in from seeing the dawn patrols take the air and the anti-aircraft standing to their guns at dawn . . . I have been gratified by the precision with which the planes get off each morning at 4:30 a. m. . . ."

June 27, 1940

Letter prepared from Chief of Staff to General Herron, but not sent on account of secrecy. Explain reasons for the above alert, which were:

"Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources lead to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific Raid against Oahu following the departure of the United States fleet from Hawaii. . . ."

"Whether the information or discussions were correct, I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were by discouraging any overt act."

"In any event, it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions. The world is so troubled and changing so rapidly that I think it wise for you to keep the command definitely on its toes until I give you the all clear signal."

July 16, 1940

Radiogram from Chief of Staff to C. G., Hawaiian Department: (Gives authority to relax alert)

"You are authorized at your discretion, to relax alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness; second, aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice."

August 28, 1940

Letter Chief of Staff to General Herron, asking reactions as to continued alert:

[9] "As to the alert, I want your frank reaction. Is it imposing too heavy

a tax to continue on the present basis . . . ? It is a very difficult business and I am deeply concerned that we do not exhaust the morale of the command by heavy requirements during what is supposed to be a period of peace, yet a failure would be catastrophic."

September 6, 1940

Reply to General Herron reference burden imposed by alert. "My absolute frank and honest opinion is that the alert as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that the maneuvers being held will build up materially and easily the effectiveness of the alert."

"The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolute secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much."

July 7, 1941

Radio sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department:

"For your information deduction from important information from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army, and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of the Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned."

July 25, 1941

Joint dispatch sent by Chief of Staff and Chief of [10] Naval Operations by naval radio:

"Appropriate addresses please deliver copies to Commanding Generals of Philippines, Hawaiian, and Caribbean Defense Commands and also to General Chaney in London. You are herewith advised that on July 26 the United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan. It is expected that these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through the medium of a licensing system for certain matériel. . . . Japanese funds and assets in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not expected that Japanese merchant ships in ports of the United States will be shifted at this time. United States flag merchant ships will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by the Japanese. Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means but, you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities. Action is being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. Except from immediate Army and Navy subordinates, the contents of this dispatch are to be kept secret."

October 18, 1941

Radiogram sent by War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent."

November 24, 1941

Radiogram from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet: "There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a

surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has [11] seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 15) inform senior Army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch."

November 26, 1941

Extract of secret cablegram sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines X X X before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns."

November 27, 1941

Secret first priority message to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities can not, repeat can not, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

November 28, 1941

Radiogram C. G., Hawaiian Department to Chief of Staff: "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad 472, the 27th."

[12]

December 7, 1941

Radio to C. G., Hawaiian Department, from Chief of Staff (left Message Center at 12:17 P. M.): "Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P. M., Eastern Standard Time, today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform Naval authorities of this communication."

Means Provided for Defense

1. Troops.

Units with strength thereof actually present in the Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, are shown in Tab "A".

2. Airplanes.

See Tab "B".

3. Antiaircraft Materiel.

The status of antiaircraft materiel in Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, was as shown in Tab "C". Existing shortages had not been met because of nonavailability of equipment.

4. Seacoast Defense.

See Tab "D".

5. Aircraft Warning Service.

(a) The approved project provides for 6 mobile detector sets and 6 fixed sets to be located as shown on the attached map. All of these sets have a rated range of 120 miles, but under favorable conditions efficient service has been obtained in excess of the rated range.

(b) The six (6) mobile sets and three (3) fixed sets were on hand in the Hawaiian Department December 7, 1941. The remaining three fixed sets had not been shipped from the mainland.

(c) The three (3) fixed sets on hand were scheduled for installation at the sites given below. Construction had started, but had not been completed.

Mt. Kaala, Oahu
Kokee, Kauai
Haleakala, Maui

[13] (d) The six (6) mobile sets were scheduled for the locations shown on the attached map. Their actual location on December 7, 1941, is not known to the War Department.

6. Considered broadly, defense projects which have been under construction for some time and for which funds have been provided are as follows:

Bunkers for dispersed airplanes
Development of airfields
Bombproofing of vital installations
Bombproof ammunition storage
Command and Fire Control Cable System
Storage for gasoline and oil defense reserves (Splinter-proof)
Military roads, trails and railroads
Modernization of seacoast artillery
8'' Railway battery positions

7. All reasonable requests by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department for funds and the supply of equipment & materiel have been met within the means available.

Brief of Chronological Record of Correspondence Between the War Department and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Matters of Importance since December 7, 1941

DECEMBER 7, 1941

Serial No.	Time	From	To	
1	12:17 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Alert.
2	3:34 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Japanese Bombers Attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, Wheeler Field. Extensive Damages.
[14] 3	5:00 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Report of Casualties.
4	6:30 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Report of Second Attack at 11:00 A. M.
5	7:30 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Authority to Incur Necessary Obligations.

DECEMBER 8, 1941

1	2:40 P. M.	C/S	HHD	Radiogram: Rush Report of Operations. Readiness for Further Attack? Priorities for Assistance?
2	2:38 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Request for Shipment Ammunition.
3		TAG	HHD	Cable: Prepare to Carry Out Tasks Assigned by Rainbow 5 Pertaining to Germany and Italy.

DECEMBER 9, 1941

1	11:30 P. M.	HHD	C/S	Radiogram: Report of Operations. Request for Troops, Ammunition and Matériel.
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DECEMBER 10, 1941

2	7:48 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Request for Ammunition.
3		HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Request for 2 Additional Infantry Regiments.

DECEMBER 11, 1941

1	10:55 A. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: War with Germany and Italy.
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Brief of Chronological Record of Correspondence Between the War Department and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Matters of Importance since December 7, 1941

DECEMBER 12, 1941

Serial No.	Time	From	To	
1	1:35 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Authority to Evacuate Dependents to Mainland. Radiogram: Martial Law in Effect. Situation Quiet.
2	5:35 P. M.	HHD	TAG	

DECEMBER 13, 1941

1	1:05 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Listing Units, Airplanes, Bombs, Equipment, and Ammunition being Dispatched Hawaii.
[16] 2	9:16 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Plan of Defense Canton and Christmas.

DECEMBER 14, 1941

1	10:22 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Are you Planning to Garrison Outlying Islands?
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DECEMBER 15, 1941

1	3:45 P. M.	HHD	C-2	Radiogram: Summary of Enemy Activity Hawaii 8 Dec. to 12 Dec.
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DECEMBER 16, 1941

1	5:20 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Report of Sub Attack Kahului Maui.
2	8:55 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Disposition for Defenses of Airfields Outlying Islands.
3		HHD	TAG	Letter: Report Battle Oahu.

DECEMBER 18, 1941

2	3:27 P. M.	Pomona	TAG	Radiogram: Unit of Command Vested in Navy Effective this Date.
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L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

5 Incls:

- Incl. 1—Troops, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab A).
- Incl. 2—Airplanes, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab B).
- Incl. 3—AA Org & Equip Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab C).
- Incl. 4—Seacoast Def Org, Haw Dept (Tab D).
- Incl. 5—Map, AWS, Haw Dept.

[16] A. Major Units in Hawaii, December 7, 1941

1. Department Headquarters and Headquarters Troops
 - 34th Engrs. (C)
 - 804th Engr. Bn (How) at Canton
 - How Pack Train
 - Co. A, 1st Chem. Bn.
 - Aircraft Warning Co.
2. Hawaiian Air Force
 - 5th Bomb Group
 - 23d Bomb Sq.
 - 31st Bomb Sq.
 - 72d Bomb Sq.
 - 4th Rec. Sq.
 - 11th Bomb Group
 - 26th Bomb Sq.
 - 42d Bomb Sq.
 - 50th Rec. Sq.

2. Hawaiian Air Force—Continued

- 58th Bomb Sq. (Lt)
- 18th Pursuit Group (I)
- 6th Pursuit Sq. (I)
- 19th Pursuit Sq. (I)
- 78th Pursuit Sq. (I)
- 44th Pursuit Sq. (I)
- 72d Pursuit Sq. (I)
- 73d Pursuit Sq. (I)
- 15th Pursuit Group (F)
- 45th Pursuit Sq. (F)
- 16th Pursuit Sq. (F)
- 47th Pursuit Sq. (F)
- 86th Observation Squadron
- Air Corps Services

3. Harbor Defense Troops

- 15th CA (HD)
- 16th CA (HD)
- 41st CA (Ry)
- 55th CA (155 mm) (TD)

[17] 4. Antiaircraft Units

- 64th CA (AA) SM
- 97th CA (AA) SM
- 98th CA (AA) SM
- 251st CA (AA) M

5. Beach and Land Defense

- 24th Division
- 25th Division
- 11th Tank Co (L)

Total Strength—2,149 Officers

48 WO
166 ANC
40,494 EM

42,857 Total

[18] B. Airplanes—Hawaii

Number on December 7, 1941

Modern

Type:	No.	
B-17D-----	12	} Pursuit and Bombardment
A-20A-----	12	
P-40B-----	86	
P-40C-----	13	

123

C-47B-----	12	} Observation Transportation
C-49-----	3	
C-33-----	2	

OA-4A/OAS/OA9----- 5 Observation Amphibian

BT2B1/2BR/2CR----- 4 Basic Trainer

AT6----- 4 Advanced Trainer

Non-modern

B12A-----	6	} Medium Bomber
B-18-----	33	
A-12-----	9	} Light Bomber
P-26A-----	9	
P-26B-----	7	} Light Bomber Pursuit
P-36A-----	46	

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[19]

C. Antiaircraft

Organization and armament, Hawaiian Department, Dec. 7, 1941

	Authorized		37mm (AA)	Cal. .50 MGs
	Mobile 3" AA	Fixed 3" AA		
64th CA (AA).....	24		30	1 40
251st CA (AA).....	12		30	1 28
97th CA (AA).....	24		30	1 40
98th CA (AA).....	24	12	30	1 16
Harbor Defense Units.....		14		
Total.....	72	26	120	1 124
On Hand.....	60	26	20	113
Shortage.....	12	0	100	1 233

¹ Figures include cal. .50 MGs in MG batteries and for local protection of AA gun batteries, fixed and mobile.

² Maintenance allowance not included.

³ + 222 for local defense of S. C. Btry airfields.

[20]

Seacoast

Caliber	No. Guns	No. Btrys	Location
16"	2 (BC)	1	Weaver.
16"	2 (BC)	1	Barrette.
14"	2 (DC)	1	De Russy.
12"	2 (BC)	1	Kam.
12"	#2 (DC)	1	Kam.
12"	#4 (M)	1	Ruger.
12"	#4 (M)	1	Ruger.
12"	# (M)	1	Kam.
8"	2 (BC)	1	Ruger.
8"	4 (Rwy)	1	Kaneohe Bay.
8"	4 (Rwy)	1	Puuiki.
8"	4 (Rwy)	1	Browns Camp.
8"	#4 (Rwy)	1	Waianae.
8"	#4 (Rwy)	1	Alt. Maill.
			Kahuku.
			Alt. Malahoa.
6"	#2 (DC)	1	DeRussy.
6"	#2 (DC)	1	Kam. 9
3"	#2 (BC)	1	Armstrong.
3"	#2 (BC)	1	Kam.
155 mm	4.	1	Kam.
155 mm	4.	1	Barbers Pt.
155 mm	4.	1	Sand Is.
155 mm	4.	1	Ruger.
155 mm	4.	1	Ashley.
155 mm	4.	1	Kawailoa.
155 mm	#4.	1	Weaver.
155 mm	#4.	1	Ewa Beach.
155 mm	#4.	1	Brown's Camp.
155 mm	#4.	1	Kahuku.
155 mm	#4.	1	Koko Head.
155 mm	#4.	1	Punch Bowl.
155 mm	4.	1	Kaneohe Bay.
155 mm	4.	1	Kaneohe Bay.
155 mm	4.	1	#not manned initially.

(The remaining portion of Exhibit No. 63 is a map of the Territory of Hawaii relating to "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department" and will be found reproduced as Item No. 63, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1941

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It is hereby ordered that the following documents be made available to the public: